Financial Vulnerability and Stabilization Policy in Commodity Exporting Emerging Economies by Jalali Naini, Ahmad Reza & Naderian, Mohammad Amin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial Vulnerability and Stabilization
Policy in Commodity Exporting
Emerging Economies
Ahmad Reza Jalali Naini and Mohammad Amin Naderian
institute for studies in management and planning, Ministry of
petroleum
1 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84481/
MPRA Paper No. 84481, posted 14 February 2018 14:19 UTC
1 
 
 
Financial Vulnerability and Stabilization Policy in Commodity Exporting 
Emerging Economies 
 
 
Ahmad Reza Jalali-Naini 
Associate professor, the institute for studies in management and planning.  
Address: No.6, Shahid Mokhtar Asgari, Jamal Abad, Tehran, Iran, Postal code: 1978911114. 
Email: a.jalali@imps.ac.ir. 
 
Mohammad Amin Naderian 
Ministry of petroleum. 
Address: Taleghani Ave., Tehran, Iran, Postal code: 1593657919.  
Email: ma.naderian@mop.ir. 
 
Abstract: 
This paper develops a new Keynesian DSGE model compatible with the structural 
characteristics of commodity exporting developing economies (financial 
vulnerability, relatively high pass-through rates, procyclical fiscal policy, and high 
terms of trade volatility) to compare the performance of alternative policy regimes, 
namely flexible domestic inflation targeting, flexible consumer price index inflation 
targeting, and the real exchange rate targeting. Evaluation of the above alternative 
policy regimes and relative stability of key macroeconomic variables are conducted 
through an optimal Ramsey policy method. The policy evaluation results based both 
on stabilization and welfare measures obtained for the case of Iran imply that for the 
developing commodity (oil) exporting economies stabilization with a broader 
inflation targeting framework in which the real exchange rate is also targeted is the 
superior policy regime. Optimality of the alternative policy regimes and their rank 
are sensitive to the degree of financial vulnerability. Financial vulnerability in this 
model explains why departure from floating exchange rate in an inflation targeting 
framework is the appropriate policy and not merely a “fear”. As the degree of 
financial development increases sufficiently, the standard flexible inflation targeting 
becomes the superior policy regime. A policy rule to weaken procyclicality of fiscal 
policy further enhances the welfare performance of this regime. 
 
JEL Classification: E52; F31; F41; O24. 
Keywords: Financial vulnerability; inflation targeting; fear of floating; Ramsey 
method.  
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1- Introduction: 
Commodity dependence amongst the developing and emerging economies not only 
continues to be significant but for a large numbers of them it is currently more than 
in the past.1 Capital inflows to this group of countries tend to co-move with 
commodity prices and magnify the effects of terms of trade shocks. The propagation 
effect associated with procyclicality of the terms of trade, capital inflow and fiscal 
policy frequently results in amplification of the aggregate demand and appreciation 
of the real exchange rate.2 Without an accompanying productivity shock, the initial 
boom fizzles out in time--more rapidly if the initial positive commodity price shock 
is short-lived. A negative commodity price shock has a propagation effect in the 
opposite direction. Note, however, that in financially vulnerable emerging 
economies the influence of joint terms of trade shock and global credit shock may 
not be symmetric. In this type of economies, the consequences of a negative shock 
are more severe, often it is followed by a currency collapse, business bankruptcy, 
and economic contraction. The susceptibility of the developing and emerging 
countries, in particular commodity exporting economies, to global cycles implies the 
need for a robust stabilization policy. A large number of the countries that have 
experienced such booms and busts have been inflation targeters. In the standard 
flexible inflation targeting (IT) framework the central bank stabilizes the domestic 
economy with the short-term interest rate and the external sector through floating 
exchange rates. Is this policy arrangement suitable for the developing and the 
emerging market economies (EME) countries? The EMEs have had a generally 
positive experience with IT as average inflation rates have declined significantly 
subsequent to implementation of this stabilization policy framework. Nonetheless, 
IT performance in the EMEs has been inferior to that in the developing economies 
in at least two respects: deviations from both the central and the upper bound of the 
announced inflation targets (Fraga et al 2013). Such deviations could be due to 
differences in macroeconomic environment/structure, financial market conditions, 
and/or differences in the degree of policy credibility3. 
 
For standard IT to work properly at least two assumptions must be maintained: 
validity of Marshall-Lerner and uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) conditions. In 
this environment, short-term interest rate is the sole instrument for stabilization of 
both domestic and external sectors. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand have relied on this standard approach for good use (Dib, 2008). Is the 
                                                          
1 For more details see Akyüz (2017). 
2 Formore details on global cycles, commodity prices and capital inflows see Reinhart et al 
(2016). 
3 On this and related matters see Agénor and Pereira da Silva 2013. 
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standard IT equally suitable in economies with structural features like relatively high 
exchange rate pass through rates and incompletely integrated financial market prone 
to financial vulnerability4? This question is particularly relevant for commodity 
exporting developing economies as they face similar problems plus they often are 
subject to large terms of trade shocks. Negative terms of trade shocks can set 
speculative forces in the currency market resulting in a higher exchange rate risk 
premium that can create a new source of inefficiency with complicating effects on 
inflation, output, and the real exchange rate (RER). This is a kind of environment 
that can force the hand of the central bank to deviate from its announced inflation 
target. Under this setting, adjustment of short-term interest rates to stabilize the 
domestic and external sector does not suffice and the central bank requires a 
supplementary instrument to manage the external and along with that an amended 
loss function and a targeting rule to conduct optimal policy. 
 
The existing literature suggests three ways of overcoming this problem for the 
inflation targeting central banks. For commodity exporting developing economies, 
one suggested policy solution is to target the export price index (Frankel 2010). 
Ghosh et al (2016) argue that, in the EMEs that face significant currency mismatches 
in the domestic balance sheets and exhibit structural features such as high exchange 
rate pass-through rates and restricted inter-sectoral factor mobility, the issue of 
exchange rate volatility cannot be ignored. They propose two target two instrument-
dual instrument solution: interest rate for targeting domestic inflation and output and 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention for easing adverse currency movements.5 
Anamaría Pieschacón (2012) and Stephen Snudden (2016) highlight the role of fiscal 
policy in stabilizing macroeconomic volatility and welfare gain in oil exporting 
economies. It is argued that counter-cyclical fiscal policy can ameliorate oil 
(commodity) price shocks in small open oil exporting economies. Moreover, this 
creates a more suitable environment to practice standard inflation targeting.  
 
                                                          
4 Financial vulnerability here refers to the capability of the domestic financial markets to deal with adverse 
currency market shocks. More specifically, the sensitivity of the currency-market risk premium to 
meaningful depreciation of the real exchange rate (Cavoli 2009). In a financially vulnerable economy, 
exchange rate shocks can strongly be transmitted to the real economy via induced changes in the risk 
premium. This term will be discussed more in detail in section 2.  
5 Note that in the context of the New Keynesian models and the associated inflation targeting literature, 
when pricing by firms is of Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) variety, optimal policy is to target domestic 
inflation rate and let the currency to float. However, monetary authority's reaction to exchange rate 
movements along with inflation and output gap is the optimal policy provided that price setting in the 
international market is of the Local Currency Pricing (LCP) variety and/or domestic financial market is 
incompletely integrated into the global markets Engel (2014) and Corsetti et al (2010). In this paper both 
issues is dealt with but goes further.   
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While the above policy approaches discuss the relevant issues and identify pertinent 
policy challenges facing the EMEs, the issues can be robustly integrated in a more 
general framework with explicit micro-foundation. Moreover, it is important to 
incorporate the issue of financial vulnerability as it helps to provide a channel for 
the impact of commodity-price (or terms of trade) volatility on variations of the 
exchange rate risk premia and the consequent negative balance-sheet effect that it 
may engender. We think this is a key channel and is a major rationale for the aversion 
to float6. Historical evidence suggests that numerous EMEs are disinclined to float 
their currencies. Even those countries that de jure proclaim to have a floating 
currency regime, de facto they do not practice it (Calvo and Reinhart 2002, 
Kliatskova et al, 2015)7. As a result, there is a tendency to limit exchange rate 
adjustments, even in the aftermath of terms of trade shocks.8 To the extent that 
incomplete international financial market integration implies that EMEs cannot 
borrow from the global markets abroad in their own currency (“original sin”) and 
foreign debt holding by the households and business sectors is not insignificant, 
there is reluctance on the part of the monetary authority to let their currencies float. 
The aversion to float emanates from the adverse effect of currency depreciation on 
household, corporate, and the banking sector balance sheets and the potential 
contractionary consequences of a sizable decline in the price of the domestic 
currency.9 When the balance sheet effect overwhelms the Marshall-Lerner 
condition, contractionary devaluation is more likely. The inflationary consequences 
of exchange rate devaluation can also be an additional concern for the central bank.  
 
                                                          
6 Other reasons in this regard are lack of credibility and high level of exchange rate pass-through rate to 
prices. The latter is also incorporated in our model along with financial vulnerability.  
7 Kliatskova et al (2015) show that in a sample of 15 emerging economies namely Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, 
and Turkey, with large foreign exchange debt in the non-financial private sector tend to react more strongly 
to exchange rate changes using both FX intervention and interest rate. Thus, their results support the 
important role of balanced sheet effect in the fear of floating behavior of aforementioned countries. 
8 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that a long-standing challenge for monetary authorities in the developing 
economies has indeed been “fear of floating”. 
9 When firms or households borrow (including financing imports) in units of foreign currency whereas 
income flow is in local currency, depreciation of the domestic currency results in higher debt-service costs. 
If the extent of borrowing and depreciation is significant, it can lead to bankruptcies, and reduction of 
aggregate expenditures. If currency exposures by household and firms are financed by the domestic banking 
system, the cash flow problems can further spill over to the banking sector, exacerbating financial 
instability.  
5 
 
This paper identifies two distinct routes through which policy trade-offs are affected 
by the existence of the above channel. First and foremost, this paper recognizes that 
financial vulnerability through its influence on the exchange rate risk premium 
results in the creation of a new source of economic inefficiency and policy trade-off.  
Breakdown of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relationship warrants reaction 
to real exchange rate movement by the policy maker that helps to reduce exchange 
rate volatility and mitigates the welfare loss associated with this economic 
inefficiency. Hence, we justify “fear of floating” by explaining why under certain 
structural conditions departure from free floating is the appropriate policy. The paper 
also recognizes that, aside from capital inflows, in most commodity exporting 
countries, fiscal policy is the propagation mechanism for commodity price variation. 
Therefore, implementation of a fiscal rule to control propagation effects of pro-
cyclical fiscal policies should augment standard monetary policy packages, 
particularly in those economies with large non-Ricardian agents.  Implementation of 
a fiscal rule in commodity (oil) exporting countries can control flow of foreign 
exchange thus rendering currency fluctuations less disruptive. This creates a more 
conducive environment for monetary policy. Iran, like many commodity exporting 
developing economies, such as Brazil, Chili, Peru, Indonesia, and Russia, exhibits 
features described as in the above (Kliatskova et al 2015). In particular, fiscal 
spending have been strongly pro-cyclical during boom times; when oil revenues are 
high (above trend), oil-financed government expenditures rise and often during low 
oil price periods, real government expenditures fall.10 
   
The model presented in this paper is in tune with the structural characteristics of 
commodity exporting developing economics, in particular Iran. The model pertains 
to economies with local currency pricing, incomplete international risk sharing, 
financial vulnerability, presence of non-Ricardian agents, and subject to the oil 
revenue shocks. Fiscal policy in the model is specified in such a way to cover 
different degrees of pro-cyclicality: complete and incomplete raiding of natural 
resource revenue (complete and incomplete procyclicality). The fiscal rule is the 
device that can weaken pro-cyclical oil-financed fiscal expansion in order to 
undermine positive correlation between oil revenue shocks and inflation. Using 
                                                          
10 Government owned oil export revenues are denominated in foreign currency and to finance domestic 
expenditures, the export proceeds are sold by the fiscal authority to the central bank. This procedure 
establishes an institutional link between fiscal operations and central bank's balance sheet. In this scheme, 
when aggregate demand rises as a consequence of higher oil-financed government expenditures, large 
amount of foreign currency is also sold to the public which tends to keep a lid on the exchange rate.  
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optimal Ramsey rule approach, we evaluate the welfare and stabilization 
performance of three monetary policy regimes: flexible domestic inflation targeting, 
flexible consumer price inflation targeting, and real exchange rate targeting, 
respectively. The weight of the real exchange rate gap in the policy loss function is 
allowed to increase from zero in the first regime to the highest value in the third 
policy regime, reflecting the extent of foreign exchange market intervention by the 
central bank. Our findings show that given the model’s structure and the Bayesian 
estimated parameters, the real exchange rate targeting (RERT) policy regime is the 
superior one. Moreover, the implementation of a fiscal rule through an oil 
(commodity) stabilization fund (OSF) do not change the superiority of this policy 
regime even though it has a meaningful influence on the welfare performance of the 
flexible consumer price inflation targeting. Notably, a reduction in the degree of 
vulnerability of the domestic financial market results in change of the rank of policy 
regimes. In a low financial vulnerability environment, flexible consumer price 
targeting becomes the superior policy regimes—indicating the influence of the 
relative deepness of the financial market and reduced sensitivity of the exchange rate 
risk premium to currency depreciation.  
 
We proceed as follows. In section (2), the structural features of commodity-
exporting developing economies, including Iran are described. In section (3), the 
model of this paper will be presented and elaborated. Section (4), discusses three 
distinct monetary regimes. In section (5) we provide Bayesian estimation of our 
models’ parameters. In section (6) welfare and stabilization performance of the 
policy regimes are evaluated using optimal Ramsey policy method. Moreover, 
through variation of key parameters, sensitivity analysis of the optimal welfare 
measure of each policy regime will be performed. Section (7) presents the 
concluding section.  
2- Economic Environment and the Structural Features 
Monetary and exchange rate policy design is influenced by the institutional structure 
and the political economy environment of the economy in question. To provide a 
factual background and proper motivation and context for design of an optimal 
monetary policy rule, we identify the economic and institutional characteristics of a 
representative commodity-exporting, small-open-developing economy such as Iran. 
Prior observations and research work points to the following characteristics. 
1- Terms of trade (henceforth, TOT) fluctuations is highly volatile and 
exogenous due to significant share of commodity (oil) revenues in exports. 
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Mendoza (1995) emphasized the quantitative significance of TOT shocks in 
generating business cycles. Koze (2002) points to the effect of world prices 
on business cycles in small open economies, Bhattacharya et al (2013) explore 
how financial integration influences the way in which TOT shocks impact 
business cycles in small developing countries. Mehrara et.al. (2007) found 
that TOT shock is the major contributing source of output fluctuations in Iran. 
2- The domestic financial market in developing economies often lack sufficient 
depth and it is not well-integrated into international financial markets. Based 
on a fairly wide country observation, Rojas-Suarez (2010) shows that access 
by the household and business sector to finance in EMEs and developing 
economies are limited. Zheng (2016) shows that for countries with developed 
financial markets, integration to world markets (greater risk sharing) lessens 
business cycle volatility, however, it has the opposite effect for economies 
with underdeveloped financial markets. Since the capital account is semi-open 
in Iran, national currency is not a complete substitute for internationally major 
currencies. These facts imply violation of uncovered interest rate parity 
condition (henceforth UIP) and the existence of incomplete international risk 
sharing.11 
3- The existence of a fraction of population with low savings and lack of access 
to the financial market does not provide opportunities for this non-Ricardian 
households (henceforth NRH) to smooth consumption over time. The 
existence of NHH type of households has certain implications regarding the 
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies on closing the output gap.12   
4- Small commodity (oil) exporter developing countries are by definition open 
economies. However, the degree of openness differs. Iran is a fairly open 
economy and the ratio of exports and imports to GDP is around 55 percent.  
5- The exchange rate pass-through rates is generally higher for the developing 
economies than those for the developed economies.13 The exchange rate pass-
through rate for developing economies is imperfect. For Iran the pass through 
                                                          
11 Li, Dandan et al (2012) show that the exchange rate risk premium in UIP relationship is significant for a 
set of emerging and developed economies. 
12 Following Gali (2004), since households are Ricardian fiscal policy are neutralized by their saving 
behaviors, however this generalization does not extend to non-Ricardians. In this paper our focus is on the 
raiding behavior of the government with regard to a natural resource windfall not exclusively tax policy. 
Moreover, when non-Ricardians are present fiscal policy can affect income distribution as well. 
13 The above generalization is not inconsistent with the observation that for many emerging economies the 
pass through rate has been declining over the last fifteen years. 
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rate is around 0.4-0.5. That is, the law of one price does not hold and there is 
no one-to-one relationship between the rate of change of the nominal 
exchange rate and CPI. 14 
6- Similar to a number of oil exporting countries, Iranian government sells all or 
parts of its oil revenue, denominated in foreign currency, to the central bank 
to receive domestic currency equivalent on the revenue side of the government 
budget. The larger are such revenues and the higher is the exchange rate, the 
larger is its budgetary revenues and expenditures. This institutional link 
between the government budget and the central bank’s balance sheet creates 
a positive correlation between TOT and real exchange rate.  
7- The exchange rate policy and movement in Iran has historically been 
influenced by the volume of oil revenues. During high-oil-revenue (positive 
price shock) periods, the supply of foreign exchange expands due to higher 
oil-financed government expenditures, and the material conditions for implicit 
use of exchange rate anchor improves. Such confluence of events tends to 
strengthen positive correlation between TOT and real exchange rate during 
oil-boom years.  
8- Hematy and Jalali-Naini (2015) show that for the period 1990-2013, the 
Central Bank did not pursue systematic policies to counter inflation; if any the 
policies tend to have accommodated inflation, hence the existence of an 
inflation risk premium originating in the gap between central bank targets and 
the realized levels of inflation in the Iranian economy. 
 3-Model Description 
We present a new Keynesian small open economy model for a class of commodity 
(oil) exporting countries (such as Iran) incorporating their salient characteristics like, 
imperfect international risk sharing, limited monetary policy credibility, local 
currency pricing15, and the existence of non-Ricardian households.  
3-1- Domestic Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households on the 
interval [0,1]. A fraction (1-µ) consists of Ricardian households (RH) with access to 
financial markets where they can trade a full set of contingent claims. The remaining 
                                                          
14 Notwithstanding the incomplete exchange rate pass-through, the speed of nominal exchange rate 
influence on CPI inflation in Iran is relatively considerable, particularly during the negative TOT shocks. 
15 This feature entails of the law of one price hence exchange rate pass-through rate can be either high or 
low. 
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fraction µ, are NRH types that do not own assets and financial liability. Moreover, 
due to their lack of access to financial markets they consume all their disposable 
income in each period. It is assumed that the labor market is competitive, the wage 
rate is the same across all households, and both types of households work the same 
number of hours. 
The Ricardian households seek to maximize their intertemporal utility 
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡 [
(𝐶𝑡
𝑟)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
− Ψ
(𝑁𝑡)
1+η
1 + η
]     (1)
∞
𝑡=0
 
Where 𝐸𝑡 denotes conditional expectation based on information set in period t. 
Parameter 𝛽 is the subjective discount factor, 𝜎 is the inverse inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution and 𝜂 denotes inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply.  
Ricardian households have access to two distinct assets: one period domestic savings 
(borrowing), 𝐷𝑡, and one period foreign savings (borrowing), 𝐵𝑡
∗. There are no 
adjustment costs for changes in the portfolio composition. Therefore, each RH enters 
period t with nominal domestic savings (Dt) and nominal foreign saving (εtBt−1
∗ ). 
RH receives labor income (Wt𝑁𝑡) and profits Πt and Πt
o from both the final good 
producing firms, respectively. The representative household uses these funds to 
finance Ricardian consumption (𝐶𝑡
𝑟), pay lump sum taxes (𝑇𝑡
𝑟) and to accumulate 
additional amounts of domestic and foreign savings. As in Engel (2014), it is 
assumed that there is a wedge between the returns to contingent claims for the 
domestic and foreign households due to international financial market imperfections. 
Therefore, each time a domestic RH borrows from abroad, it must pay an 
endogenous premium over the international price for external borrowings. RHH 
budget constraint is thus given by: 
Pt𝐶𝑡
𝑟 + Pt𝑇𝑡
𝑟 + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} +
εtBt
∗
(Rt
∗)𝑅𝑃𝑡
= Dt + εtBt−1
∗ + Wt𝑁𝑡 + Πt     (2) 
Rt
∗ denotes the gross foreign nominal interest, and Qt,t+1represents the stochastic 
discount factor. The premium that the domestic RH have to pay each time they 
borrow from abroad is shown by 𝑅𝑃𝑡. Corsetti et al. (2010) define 𝑅𝑃𝑡 as the 
marginal utility of a unit of currency for foreign households relative to domestic 
households and label it the relative demand gap. If international financial markets 
are perfect, i.e. international risk sharing is complete, then 𝑅𝑃𝑡=1. 
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The RH maximizes (1) with respect to consumption, domestic and foreign savings 
(borrowings), and its labor supply subject to its resource constraint (2). The first-
order conditions for consumption-domestic saving decision, consumption-foreign 
saving decision and labor-leisure choice can be used to obtain:  
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
(𝐶𝑡+1
𝑟 )−𝜎
(𝐶𝑡
𝑟)−𝜎
] =
1
𝑅𝑡
       (3) 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝜀𝑡+1𝑃𝑡
𝜀𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
(𝐶𝑡+1
𝑟 )−𝜎
(𝐶𝑡
𝑟)−𝜎
] =
1
𝑅𝑡
∗𝑅𝑃𝑡
   (4) 
Ψ(𝑁𝑡
𝑠)𝜂(𝐶𝑡
𝑟)𝜎 =
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
    (5) 
Equation (3) is the Euler condition for the domestic saving denoting consumption- 
domestic saving optimal choice, (4) is the efficiency condition for the consumption-
foreign saving, and equation (5) is the optimal labor-leisure choice.  
NRH consume all of their labor income in a “hand to mouth” fashion, therefore, they 
neither smooth their consumption against labor income fluctuations nor they react 
to interest rate changes by altering their consumption. While NRH has the same 
preferences as RH, their control variables are limited to their consumption and labor 
supply subject to following budget constraint: 
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑛𝑟 + 𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡
𝑛𝑟 = WtNt
𝑠         (6) 
Accordingly, the level of consumption can be derived as: 
𝐶𝑡
𝑛𝑟 =
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
Nt
𝑠 − 𝑇𝑡
𝑛𝑟                 (7) 
For the sake of simplification, it is assumed that NRHs do not pay taxes and 
hence  𝑇𝑡
𝑛𝑟 = 0 . Each consumption bundle ( 𝐶𝑡
𝑖 , ∀𝑖𝜖{𝑟, 𝑛𝑟} ) is a composite of 
domestic goods (𝐶𝐻,𝑡
𝑖 ) and imported consumption goods (𝐶𝐹,𝑡
𝑖 ) which is aggregated 
based on   
𝐶𝑡
𝑖 = [(1 − 𝛾)
1
𝜃⁄ (𝐶𝐻,𝑡
𝑖 )
𝜃−1
𝜃⁄ + 𝛾
1
𝜃⁄ (𝐶𝐹,𝑡
𝑖 )
𝜃−1
𝜃⁄ ]
𝜃
𝜃−1⁄
   ∀𝑖𝜖{𝑟, 𝑛𝑟}  (8) 
Parameter 𝜃 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
and  γ is a degree of openness. Each consumer, either Ricardian or non-Ricardian, 
at each level of consumption purchases a composite of domestic and foreign goods 
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to minimize the total cost of its consumption basket. The aggregate price index (Pt) 
for the consumption bundle for both RH and NRH is given by: 
Pt = [γPH,t
1−θ + (1 − γ)PF,t
1−θ]
1
1−θ⁄       (9) 
Where PH,t and PF,t are the price of domestic and imported consumption basket, 
respectively. Minimization of total consumption expenditure ( PH,t𝐶𝐻,𝑡
𝑖 +
PF,t𝐶𝐹,𝑡
𝑖 ), 𝑖𝜖{𝑟, 𝑛𝑟}  result in the demand function for differentiated domestic and 
imported goods by RH and NRH: 
𝐶𝐻,𝑡
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾) (
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃
𝐶𝑡
𝑖    , 𝑖𝜖{𝑟, 𝑛𝑟}      (10) 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡
𝑖 = γ (
PF,t
Pt
)
−θ
𝐶𝑡
𝑖      , 𝑖𝜖{𝑟, 𝑛𝑟}                 (11) 
Aggregate consumption is a weighted average of consumption for each household 
type: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝜇𝐶𝑡
𝑛𝑟 + (1 − 𝜇)𝐶𝑡
𝑟                               (12) 
Based on the notion of centralized economy-wide union in Gali (2004), with similar 
preferences and a uniform wage rate, Ricardian and non-Ricardian labor supply are 
equal. Given the real wage rate, each firm decides how much labor to hire and 
allocates its labor employment uniformly across households, independently of their 
type. 
The percentage deviation around the steady-state (lower case with tilde variables) 
for the first order condition equations (3) and (5) of RH can be written as: 
?̃?𝑡
𝑟 = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
𝑟 −
1
𝜎
(𝑖̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1)                             (13) 
𝜂?̃?𝑡 + 𝜎?̃?𝑡
𝑟 = ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡              (14) 
Equation (7) for NRH in the log-linearized form is given by: 
?̃?𝑡
𝑛𝑟 = ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡          (15) 
Using equations (12), (13), (14) and (15), the aggregate Euler equation for all 
households in log-linearized form is derived as: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − (𝜇 +
1−𝜇
𝜎
)(𝑖̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) − 𝜇(𝜂 + 1)𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡)        (16)         
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Notice that in this Euler equation, aggregate consumption depends on 𝜇 which is the 
fraction of non-Ricardian households. Moreover, the presence of NRH generates a 
direct effect from employment on the level of consumption and hence on aggregate 
demand--beyond the effect of the interest rate.  
3-2- Incomplete international risk sharing: 
Foreign households solve a problem similar to that of domestic households in the 
model. First order conditions for optimal labor supply and consumption, analogous 
to (3), (4) and (5) also hold for the households in the rest of the world. Given identical 
preferences, the following relationship can be derived: 
𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
(𝐶𝑡+1)
−𝜎
(𝐶𝑡)−𝜎
] = 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑡𝐸𝑡 [(
𝜀𝑡 
𝜀𝑡+1
)(
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+1
∗ )
(𝐶𝑡+1
∗ )−𝜎
(𝐶𝑡
∗)
−𝜎 ] =
1
𝑅𝑡
     (17) 
Variables and parameters with asterisks denote the foreign country. The real 
exchange rate is defined as 𝑄𝑡 =
𝜀𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗ 
𝑃𝑡
, and equation (17) implies that 
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝜈
∗(𝑄𝑡𝑅𝑃𝑡)
1
𝜎         (18) 
Where 𝜈∗is a proportionality constant. According to equation (18), the ratio of 
marginal utility of consumption to its price (marginal utility of a domestic currency) 
is not equal for domestic and foreign households resulting in a relative demand gap, 
captured by 𝑅𝑃𝑡 ≠ 1.
16 In other words, international risk sharing is not complete in 
the model. The basis for the presence of a relative demand gap is the existence of 
currency mismatch that may result in the balance sheet effect (Motyovzski 2016). 
The first order linear approximation around the steady state is shown by equation 
(19). 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡
∗ +
1
𝜎
(?̃?𝑡 + 𝑟?̃?𝑡)          (19) 
The law of one price gap (Ψ𝐹,𝑡) , and terms of trade (𝑆𝑡), are defined below, 
respectively as: 
                                                          
16 This is the standard relationship in the open economy models, where 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡
∗ ) =
1
𝑄𝑡  𝑅𝑃𝑡  
.  With completely integrated 
financial markets, the theory predicts that consumption growth positively and perfectly is correlated across economies, 
given an equilibrium RER. In such a case 𝑅𝑃𝑡  is zero. However the above implication is not supported by the empirical 
evidence (Backus-Smith 1994). In countries with incomplete financial markets, the positive correlation is not perfect 
and it may even be negative. In this case a risk premium will appear in (18) and in the UIP relationship (23). 
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Ψ𝐹,𝑡 =
𝜀𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡
      (20) 
𝑆𝑡 =
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
       (21) 
The log-linearized relationship between the law of one price gap, real exchange rate 
and terms of trade is: 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝐹,𝑡        (22) 
Based on first order conditions (3) and (4) and similar first order conditions for 
foreign households, it is also possible to derive the no-arbitrage condition for the 
exchange rates: 
1
𝑅𝑡
𝜀𝑡 
𝐸𝑡𝜀𝑡+1
=
1
𝑅𝑡
∗𝑅𝑃𝑡
         (23) 
Equation (23) is a deviation from the nominal interest parity condition. Linearizing 
this condition yields: 
(𝑖̃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) = (𝑖̃𝑡
∗ − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
∗ ) + 𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡) + 𝑟?̃?𝑡     (24)    
According to this equilibrium condition, the difference between the domestic and 
foreign real interest rates will result in expected future change of real exchange rate 
and relative demand gap.  
Historical observations in many EMEs and developing economies indicate that when 
access to foreign capital markets are limited, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves 
to imports (import-coverage ratio) tends to be negatively correlated to RER. The risk 
premium (𝑅𝑃𝑡) can be endogeniszed either via  𝑄𝑡 or the import coverage ratio. In 
this paper, the risk premium is modelled according to the former. Following Cavoli 
(2009), the sensitivity of the relative demand gap (𝑟?̃?𝑡) to the real exchange rate (𝜓𝑞) 
can be perceived as an indicator of the degree of financial vulnerability in a small 
open economy and can be shown as: 
 𝑟?̃?𝑡 = 𝜌𝑓𝑟?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑞?̃?𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝                    (25) 
𝑟?̃?𝑡 is influenced by an exogenous shock (𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝
) like a sudden stop or a global 
contraction in credit availability17. It is also affected endogenously by movements in 
the real exchange rate—for instance, brought about by a commodity price (TOT) 
                                                          
17 The shock term is also referred elsewhere to a “sudden stop” shock. See for example (Motyovzski 
2016). 
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shock. According to equations (24) and (25), for given levels of foreign interest rate 
and the exchange rate, a positive risk premium shock (𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝
) results in an increase in 
the domestic interest rate (?̃?𝑡) via nominal interest parity condition (equation 24) 
which, in turn, lowers Ricardian domestic consumption through equation (13). Such 
a fall in domestic consumption reduces real wage rates since it stimulates labor 
supply via labor-leisure choice (equation 14), even when there is no output gap. The 
risk premium shock generates a new source of trade-off between the relative demand 
gap (𝑟?̃?𝑡) stabilization and output gap—since by changing consumption it changes 
the level of welfare. This outcome breaks the divine coincidence and requires a new 
instrument to complement monetary policy.18  
Moreover, equation (25) indicates that, other things being equal, a real exchange rate 
depreciation results in a higher relative demand gap (𝑟?̃?𝑡), mainly due to incomplete 
hedging of the exchange rate risk in an environment of incomplete international risk 
sharing. A real depreciation results in an increase of the domestic currency value of 
external debts (for households, banks and firms) through a channel called the 
balance-sheet effect. In economies with high degrees of incomplete international risk 
sharing (financially vulnerable economies), the negative effect of currency 
depreciation via balance sheet effect could potentially more than compensate its 
positive effect on the current account, in order for the currency depreciation to have 
a contractionary effect on the domestic output.     
3-3- Domestic Firms 
There is a continuum of final good variety producers. Labor 𝑁𝑡 (𝑗) is the only factor 
of production for domestic firms to produce differentiated final goods. Domestic 
firms operate with a Cobb-Douglas production technology  
YH,t = AtNt(j)      (26)  
Where 𝐴𝑡  represents total factor productivity. It is assumed that this variable is 
exogenously determined and it evolves according to an AR(1) stochastic process: 
ln At = ρA ln At−1 + εA,t        , εA,t~IN (0, σA)           (27) 
Where the parameter 𝜌𝐴 is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, reflecting the 
persistence of domestic production technology, 𝜀𝐴,𝑡  is an independent and 
identically distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝐴.  
                                                          
18 See Zeineddine Alla et al (2017). 
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Domestic firms supply their output in a monopolistic competition market with 
differentiated goods and face Calvo (1983) type nominal rigidity that prevents them 
from adjusting their prices. In every period, the probability of price adjustment is 
1 − 𝜂𝐻 for all firms, and it is independent of its history. When the domestic firms 
have an opportunity to adjust prices, they will optimally adjust the price of their 
differentiated good ?̅?𝐻,𝑡(𝑗) in order to maximize the present discounted value of the 
flows of profits according to the following problem: 
max
P̅t(j)
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝜂𝐻
𝑘 Et{Qt,t+kYH,t+k(j)[P̅H,t(j)(1 + ζ) − MCt+k]}
∞
k=0
      (28) 
s.t: 
YH,t+k(j) = (
P̅H,t+k(j)
PH,t+k
)
−θH
(CH,t+k + GH,t+k + CH,t+k
∗ )      (29)   
Where parameter 𝜁 denotes the Pigovian subsidy to the firms. Equation (29) is the 
demand function for the differentiated good that the domestic firm faces. Domestic 
firm’s optimization for price setting is constrained by total demand for the domestic 
differentiated goods. In equation (29), GH,t+k  is the government demand for 
domestic goods and 𝐶𝐻,𝑡+𝑘
∗  is the aggregate foreign demand for domestic goods. 
They are included in the domestic demand function due to the inclusion of firm’s 
domestic production and export (foreign demand for domestic goods) to the public 
and foreign sectors. In equilibrium, aggregate domestic firm production (𝑌𝐻,𝑡) equals 
aggregate domestic consumption ( 𝐶𝐻,𝑡 ) and government domestic consumption 
(GH,t) plus aggregate foreign demand for domestic goods (CH,t
∗ ): 
YH,t = [∫ YH,t(ℓ)
θH−1
θH dℓ
1
0
]
θH
θH−1
= CH,t + GH,t + CH,t
∗       (30) 
Nominal marginal costs (𝑀𝐶𝑡) in equation (28) can be derived from the production 
function (26): 
MCt =
𝑊𝑡 
𝑃𝐻,𝑡At
      (31)   
Now, if the optimization problem of the domestic representative firm is solved with 
respect to the control variable, i.e. the reset price ?̅?𝐻,𝑡(𝑗), the first order condition is: 
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P̅H,t(j) = P̅H,t =
θH
(θH − 1)(1 + ζ)
∑ (𝜂𝐻β)
kEt[Qt,t+kYH,t+kMCt+k]
∞
k=0
∑ (𝜂𝐻β)kEt[Qt,t+kYH,t+k]
∞
k=0
      (32) 
As the price-setting problem for all domestic firms in each period is similar, they 
will set the same price. Thus, the aggregate price index is: 
𝑃𝐻,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑗)
1−𝜃𝐻𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
1
1−𝜃𝐻    (33)  
Since there are an infinite number of firms, there will be exactly the fraction 1 − 𝛼𝐻 
firms who can update their price in any period and exactly 𝛼𝐻 fraction of firms that 
cannot. Furthermore, since these firms are randomly drawn, the distribution of any 
subset of the firms is the same as the distribution of all firms. This implies the 
following law of motion for the dynamics of the domestic price: 
PH,t = [𝛼𝐻𝑃𝐻,𝑡−1
1−𝜃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼𝐻)?̅?𝐻,𝑡
1−𝜃𝐻]
1
1−θH       (34) 
By log-linearizing (34) and combining with (33), a typical forward-looking Philips 
curve can be derived 
π̃H,t = 𝛽𝐸𝑡π̃H,t+1 + 𝜆𝐻𝑚?̃?𝑡                                   (35) 
Where 𝜆𝐻 =
(1−𝛼𝐻)(1−𝛽𝛼𝐻)
𝛼𝐻
. Equation (35) yields the New Keynesian aggregate supply 
relation. 
3-4- Importing retail firms 
Local currency pricing or incomplete exchange rate pass-through is captured in our 
model through retail import pricing. It is assumed that domestic market is populated 
by local retailers who import differentiated import goods at competitive world 
prices. These firms act as monopolistically competitive re-distributors of these goods 
to solve for their optimal markup problem. This creates a gap between the imported 
goods price in the domestic currency terms and the domestic retail price of imported 
goods. In this setup along with incomplete exchange rate pass-through, the deviation 
from the law of one price is allowed. 
Consider a local retailer importing good j at a cost  𝜀𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝑡
∗  that denotes the price paid 
in the world market. Like the domestic firms, the same retailer faces a downward 
sloping demand for such a good and therefore chooses a price ?̅?𝐹,𝑡(𝑗), expressed in 
units of domestic currency, to maximize: 
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max
P̅F,t(j)
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝜂𝐹
𝑘Et{Qt,t+kYF,t+k(j)[P̅F,t(j) − 𝜀𝑡𝑃𝐹,𝑡
∗ ]}
∞
k=0
      (36) 
s.t: 
Y𝐹,t+k(j) = (
P̅F,t+k(j)
PF,t+k
)
−θF
(CF,t+k + GF,t+k)      (37)   
In general, the degree of stickiness in the adjustment process of domestic prices (𝛼𝐻) 
is allowed to differ from that of import prices expressed in local currency (𝛼𝐹). The 
FOC for this problem yields:  
P̅F,t(j) = P̅F,t =
θF
(θF − 1)
∑ (𝛼𝐹β)
kEt[Qt,t+kY𝐹,t+k𝜀𝑡+𝑘𝑃𝐹,𝑡+𝑘
∗ ]∞k=0
∑ (𝛼𝐹β)kEt[Qt,t+kYF,t+k]
∞
k=0
      (38) 
In equilibrium, aggregate import supply (𝑌𝐹,𝑡) equals aggregate domestic demand 
for foreign goods by households and government (𝐶𝐹,𝑡 + GF,t): 
YF,t = [∫ YF,t(ℓ)
θF−1
θ𝐹 dℓ
1
0
]
θ𝐹
θ𝐹−1
= C𝐹,t + GF,t      (39) 
Since the price-setting problem for all import retailers in each period is similar, they 
all set the same price. Thus, the aggregate import price index in this condition is: 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝐹,𝑡(𝑗)
1−𝜃𝐹𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
1
1−𝜃𝐹    (40)  
For the reasons mentioned in conjunction with (34) the following law of motion for 
the dynamics of the domestic foreign price is obtained: 
PF,t = [𝛼𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1
1−𝜃𝐹 + (1 − 𝛼𝐹)?̅?𝐹,𝑡
1−𝜃𝐹]
1
1−θ𝐹       (41) 
By log-linearizing (41) and combining it with (38), a typical forward-looking Philips 
curve is obtained: 
π̃𝐹,t = 𝛽𝐸𝑡π̃𝐹,t+1 + 𝜆𝐻?̃?𝐹,𝑡                                   (42) 
Where 𝜆𝐹 =
(1−𝛼𝐹)(1−𝛽𝛼𝐹)
𝛼𝐹
 and 𝜓𝐹,𝑡is the linear version of the law of one price gap 
variable. It is defined as: 
 ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝐹,𝑡                                     (43) 
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Based on (43), import price inflation rises as the world price of imports exceeds the 
local currency price of the same good hence a nominal depreciation determines a 
wedge between the price paid by the importers in the world market and the local 
currency price charged in the domestic market. This wedge tends to increase the real 
marginal cost and therefore increases foreign good inflation.  
3-5- Aggregate Supply 
Incomplete pass-through rate breaks down the proportionality relationship between 
the real marginal cost (𝑚𝑐𝑡) and output gap (Monacelli 2003). In the local currency 
pricing environment, the real marginal cost is proportional to both the deviations of 
current output from its natural level and to the deviation from the law of one price. 
Interpreting deviation from the law of one price as the endogenous supply (cost-
push) shock, the Philips curve for domestic prices can be rearranged as: 
π̃H,t = 𝛽𝐸𝑡π̃H,t+1 + 𝑘𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝑘𝜓?̃?𝐹,𝑡           (44) 
Based on (9), CPI inflation is a convex combination of both domestic and import 
price inflation up to a log-linear approximation. By combining log linearized version 
of (9), (42), and (44) we can obtain a CPI-based aggregate supply curve: 
 π̃t = 𝛽𝐸𝑡π̃t+1 + 𝑘𝑦
𝑐 ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑘𝜓
𝑐 ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋                  (45) 
Like domestic producer inflation in (44), CPI inflation is also influenced by law of 
one price gap (?̃?𝐹,𝑡) for a given level of output gap. Stabilizing inflation in the face 
of movements in ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 requires that the output gap ?̃?𝑡 be allowed to fluctuate. 
Stabilizing the output gap in the face of movements in ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 requires fluctuation of 
the rate of inflation rate. Therefore, an additional source of trade-off between 
stabilization of output gap and CPI measure of inflation emerges that violates the 
divine coincidence.  
 
3-6- The Oil sector 
Oil production is highly capital intensive and much of capex in the oil exporting 
developing economies is financed by foreign direct investment of various type. 
Thus, for simplification we can assume the following exogenous process for output 
in oil sector: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑜 = (
𝑌𝑡−1
𝑜
𝑌𝑜
)𝜌𝑌𝑜 𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑌𝑜
                           (46) 
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Where 𝜌𝑌𝑜 ≤ 1, 𝜀𝑡
𝑌𝑜~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
𝑌𝑜) is the oil production shock and 𝑌𝑜 (without a 
time subscript) is the magnitude of oil production at the initial steady state. We also 
assume that the domestic volume of oil production is small relative to global 
production hence the international oil price 𝑃𝑡
𝑂∗is exogenous and follows the 
following process: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑂∗
𝑃𝑜∗
= (
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑂∗
𝑃𝑜∗
)𝜌𝑃𝑜 𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑝𝑜
               (47) 
Where 𝜌𝑃𝑜 ≤ 1, 𝜀𝑡
𝑃𝑜~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
𝑃𝑜is the oil price shock. Oil revenue in units of 
foreign currency is: 
𝑂𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑂∗𝑌𝑡
𝑜                        (48)     
Government owns the oil sector and thus oil revenues enters government budget as 
a key source of income. 
3-7- Fiscal policy: 
Following Berg (2013), the government collects lump-sum taxes, receives oil 
revenues, and receives transfers from oil stabilization fund (henceforth OSF). 
Therefore, the flow government budget constraint is written as: 
𝜀𝑡𝑂𝑅𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡(𝑅𝑡
∗)𝐹𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝐹𝑡                  (49) 
Where 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡
𝑟 , 𝐺𝑡 denotes real government expenditures, 𝐹𝑡 represents OSF's asset 
value, and  𝑅𝑡
∗  is the exogenous foreign gross real interest rate.  
Government expenditure is assumed exogenous and follows the process in (50) 
𝐺𝑡 = (
𝐺𝑡−1
𝐺
)𝜌𝐺𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝐺
      (50) 
Where 𝜌𝐺 ≤ 1, 𝜀𝑡
𝐺~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
𝐺)is the government expenditure shock. 
Government consumption is composed of both domestic and imported goods. It is 
assumed that the elasticity of substitution and import ratio in government 
consumption is the same as that for private consumption. Government demand for 
domestic and foreign goods is obtained from minimization of PH,t𝐺𝐻,𝑡 + PF,t𝐺𝐹,𝑡, 
which yields: 
𝐺𝐻,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾) (
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃
𝐺𝑡              (51) 
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𝐺𝐹,𝑡 = γ (
PF,t
Pt
)
−θ
𝐺𝑡                          (52) 
In this setting, fiscal policy is represented by the value of parameter  0 ≤ 𝜒 ≤ 1 in 
equation (53). When the coefficient assumes the value of zero, we have the case of 
complete raiding fiscal policy (consumption of all oil revenues) and when it is a 
positive fraction, that fraction of oil revenues is invested in an OSF for 
macroeconomic stabilization. In this case the fund provides a fiscal buffer to smooth 
government spending. Our simple policy rule allows for depositing in withdrawing 
from the OSF as in (53). 
𝐹𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡−1 = 𝜒(𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑅)                            (53) 
Where 𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑅 is the quantity of oil revenue above its steady-state level, i.e. 
surplus oil revenue  or the windfall. For a given path of government consumption, 
surplus oil revenues (𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑅) > 0 are saved in stabilization oil fund. Conversely, 
when there is a revenue shortfall, (𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝑂𝑅) < 0 the fund is drawn down to 
maintain a level of expenditure commensurate with the given government 
expenditure path. 1-𝜒 is negative when funds are withdrawn from the fund. 
3-8- The Foreign Economy 
By assuming that the foreign country is large relative to the home country, it 
becomes unnecessary to distinguish between consumer price inflation and domestic 
inflation in the foreign country and that foreign and consumption are equal (Walsh 
2017). Therefore, both the foreign interest rate and inflation rate are exogenous and 
obey AR(1) process as follows: 
𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡−1
∗ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖∗                        (54) 
𝜋𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝜋𝜋𝑡−1
∗ + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋∗                    (55) 
3-9- Equilibrium Condition: 
Given prior specifications, the conditions for market equilibrium can now be 
specified. Equilibrium requires that non-oil domestic production equals 
consumption of the domestically produced goods. Since the domestic good is 
consumed by both the domestic residents (households and government) and by 
residents of the rest of the world, equilibrium requires that: 
 Yt = CH,t + GH,t + CH,t
∗ = (1 − γ) (
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃
(Ct + 𝐺𝑡) + γ (
𝑃𝐻,𝑡
𝜀𝑡 𝑃𝑡
∗)
−𝜃
𝐶𝑡
∗     (56) 
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Taking the first order linear approximation of equation (56) around symmetric 
steady-state yields: 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝑔𝑦)[(1 − γ)?̃?H,t + γc̃H,t
∗ ] + 𝑔𝑦?̃?𝑡           (57) 
By combining the goods market equilibrium condition (57) with international risk 
sharing (19) yields: 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝑔𝑦)?̃?𝑡 + 𝑔𝑦?̃?𝑡 + Ω𝑠?̃?𝑡 + Ω𝜓?̃?𝐹,𝑡 + Ω𝑓𝑟?̃?𝑡             (58) 
Where: Ω𝑠 = (1 − 𝑔𝑦)(
𝛾(𝜃𝜎+(𝜃𝜎−1)(1−𝛾)
𝜎
) + 𝑔𝑦(𝛾𝜃)  , Ω𝜓 = (1 − 𝑔𝑦)
𝛾((𝜃𝜎−1)
𝜎
 , 
Ω𝑓 = −(1 − 𝑔𝑦)
𝛾
𝜎
 denote the elasticity of output with respect to the terms of trade 
(?̃?𝑡), the law of one price gap (?̃?𝐹,𝑡), and relative demand gap (𝑟?̃?𝑡). 
Replacing ?̃?𝑡 from equation (58) in the aggregate Euler equation for households (16) 
yields the expectational IS- relationship: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝑔𝑦)(𝜇 +
1 − 𝜇
𝜎
)(?̃?𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1) − 𝜇(1 − 𝑔𝑦)(𝜂 + 1)𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1
− 𝑔𝑦𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1 − Ω𝑠𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1 − Ω𝜓𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝐹,𝑡+1 − Ω𝑓𝐸𝑡Δ𝑟?̃?𝑡+1
+ 𝜀𝑡
𝑦                          (59) 
This version of the IS relationship contains certain structural features of the economy 
under consideration like, local currency pricing, incomplete international risk 
sharing, and presence of non-Ricardian households. The output gap (?̃?𝑡) not only 
depends on its expectation and real interest rates, but it also depends on expected 
future change in the government expenditures (𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1), employment (𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1), 
terms of trade (𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝑡+1), law of one price gap (𝐸𝑡Δ?̃?𝐹,𝑡+1), and the relative demand 
gap (𝐸𝑡Δ𝑟?̃?𝑡+1).  
4-Policy specification 
In a closed economy with Calvo type price setting and the assumption of a constant 
Pigovian employment subsidy to compensate for the distortions associated with 
firm's market power, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that the optimal 
monetary policy is the one that replicates the flexible price equilibrium allocation. 
The policy requires stabilization of the real marginal costs (mark-ups) at their steady-
state level, implying that domestic prices are fully stabilized. With the Pigovian 
22 
 
subsidies in place, there is only one effective distortion left in economy, namely, 
sticky prices. By stabilizing mark-ups at their frictionless level, firms have no desire 
to adjust prices hence nominal rigidities are no longer binding. However, in an open 
economy violation of the law of one price and uncovered interest parity create 
inefficiencies that distort the economy beyond the presence of market power 
(Corsetti and Pesenti 2001). Generally, unlike the standard NK closed economy 
models, there are three possible sources of rigidities in the open economy: nominal 
price rigidity, nominal import price rigidity and imperfect international risk sharing. 
These rigidities bring about additional distortions that the monetary authority must 
deal with in an open economy. Therefore, the closed economy monetary-policy 
prescription does not hold and other forms of optimal monetary policy should be 
explored.  
We follow the standard assumption of a monetary authority that maximizes the inter-
temporal utility function of the representative household subject to the structural 
equations of the hypothesized model. Furthermore, we assume that the policymaker 
can credibly commit to the chosen path of action and does not re-optimize along the 
way. In short, it is assumed that the monetary authority pursues Ramsey-optimal 
policy19. 
 
4-1. Ramsey optimal monetary policy 
A number of research papers attempt to find Ramsey optimal monetary policy in 
models with nominal rigidity. In this setting, Levin, Ontaski, Williams, and Williams 
(2005) investigate the design of monetary policy when central bank faces uncertainty 
about the true structure of the economy and the optimal policy regime is found to be 
consistent with the solution that maximizes household welfare a la Ramsey.20 The 
Ramsey optimal policy under commitment can be computed by formulating an 
infinite horizon Lagrangian problem. In terms of setting the policy, the social planner 
wants to maximize the welfare given the decision of the private sector without 
relying on a particular form of policy rule. The welfare metric which is the planner’s 
objective is in the form of the lifetime utility of the representative agent—most often 
represented by the (social planner’s) policy loss function.  
                                                          
19 See Khan, King and Wolman (2003), Levin et al. (2006), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) for detailed 
discussions in New-Keynesian models. 
20 The authors then evaluate the performance of alternative simple policy rules relative to this benchmark. 
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The model presented in this paper exhibits incomplete exchange rate pass through 
variety—local currency pricing type. This specification leads to import price 
rigidity, hence existence of the law of one price gap. In this case the expenditure-
switching mechanism is partially operative and hence presents a potential role for 
the CB to remove or minimize the gaps that arise from import price rigidity. 
Alternatively, the central bank can target the real exchange rate (𝑞𝑡) to stabilize the 
law of one price gaps (𝜓𝑡). In this case, 𝑞𝑡 is also included into the loss function. 
Following Kam et al. (2009), De Paoli (2004) and Engel (2008), it is assumed that 
the central bank seeks to minimize the following loss function21. 
𝑊0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[𝜇𝜋(?̃?𝑡)
2 + 𝜇𝑥(?̃?𝑡)
2 + 𝜇𝑞(?̃?𝑡)
2 ]                 (60)
∞
𝑡=0
 
Maximization of (60) is subject to the structure of the model economy and 
appropriate initial values stipulated for forward-looking variables and Lagrange 
multipliers. In other words, the constrained optimization is subject to the equilibrium 
characterization for endogenous variables. The optimality condition for this Ramsey 
policy problem can be obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian problem with 
respect to each of the endogenous variables and setting the derivatives to zero. This 
is done numerically by using Dynare software. 
Solution to the above constrained optimization problem yields 18 endogenous 
variables and seventeen equations. Hence the planner’s optimization procedure 
would pin down the variable with an extra degree of freedom, namely the nominal 
interest rate schedule or the policy instrument. Moreover, the solution to the problem 
gives the policy instrument as a function of all state variables and shocks that can be 
obtained using numerical methods.22  
4.2. Comparative analysis of monetary policy regimes 
This section briefly describes the method of determining the effects of different 
policy regimes through changing the specification and the weights of the arguments 
in the policy loss function under different scenarios. We arrange our policy 
                                                          
21 Kam et.al (2009) raises three arguments in defense of this type of ad-hoc loss function. 1) It might be 
impossible to map a second-order approximation of the social welfare maximizing CB loss function based 
on household preferences. 2) Empirical studies indicate that the above loss function includes the goal 
variables of many developed and developing commodity-exporting economies. 3) The above loss function 
covers the alternative monetary policy in the literature that has been used to assess the usefulness of 
alternative monetary policy rules using quadratic loss functions. For more details, see Kam et al (2009). 
22 For more details, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). 
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evaluation simulations from a free-float situation to cases where the weight of the 
real exchange rate (RER) in the loss function is significant, even larger than CPI 
inflation--indicating stronger policy reaction to the exchange rate. We begin with the 
base case scenario of flexible domestic inflation targeting (FDIT) where the policy 
maker is only interested in stabilization of domestic inflation. In this case, reaction 
to exchange rate affects policy only to the extent that it influences domestic inflation 
through the Phillips curve (equation 44). In this policy regime, flexible targeting of 
domestic inflation combined with a floating exchange rate, the coefficient of the real 
exchange rate in the loss function is zero, and is given by (61). The "fear of floating" 
can be considered as some form of departure from this benchmark policy.  
𝑊0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[(π̃H,t)
2 + 0.5(?̃?𝑡)
2 ]                 (61)
∞
𝑡=0
 
The next prototype policy regime is flexible CPI inflation targeting (FCIT). In this 
framework, monetary policy maker targets CPI inflation, which entails both 
imported and domestic inflation. In contrast to the domestic inflation, CPI inflation 
contains a stronger exchange rate influence. The degree of exchange rate influence 
on CPI inflation depends on the magnitude of the exchange rate pass-through rate 
and the share of imported consumer goods in the consumption basket (openness 
ratio). Central bank reaction to fluctuations of the exchange rate depends on the 
degree by which it affects CPI inflation rate. The loss function for this case is given 
by: 
𝑊0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[(π̃t)
2 + 0.5(?̃?𝑡)
2 ]                 (62)
∞
𝑡=0
 
Note that in contrast to (61), inflation term in (62) contains exchange rate effect due 
to the inclusion of imported inflation (π̃F,t) in the determination of CPI inflation. The 
final case is that of a flexible real exchange rate targeting regime (RERT), equation 
(63). In this case, RER (?̃?𝑡) has a greater coefficient than CPI inflation, hence is 
regarded as more important by the policy maker. Specification and weighting of ?̃?𝑡 
can be seen as reflecting the fear of floating emanating from both exchange rate pass 
through and the adverse balance-sheet effects--increase in the relative value of 
foreign exchange denominated liabilities held by the domestic firms, banks, and  
households, as has occurred repeatedly in many developing economies including 
Iran. Since the central bank continues to be concerned about the output and CPI 
inflation stabilization, they are also included in its loss function (59). 
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𝑊0 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[0.5(π̃t)
2 + 0.5(?̃?𝑡)
2 + (?̃?𝑡)
2 ]                 (63)
∞
𝑡=0
 
Next we proceed by conducting Bayesian parameter estimation in the base line 
model for the Iranian economy. The performance of FDIT, FCIT and RERT in the 
base line scenario will be evaluated. We obtain unconditional standard deviation 
(stability property) of endogenous key variables as well as the optimal Ramsey 
values of the loss functions under alternative policy regimes for the base line and 
also all other scenarios.  
We solve the model with two distinct fiscal policy rules: complete and incomplete 
raiding. The former represents a perfect pro-cyclical fiscal policy and the latter can 
be interpreted as both partially pro-cyclical and acyclical (0 < 𝜒 ≤ 1) fiscal rule 
depending on the values assumed by 𝜒. The influence of fiscal policy cyclicality on 
optimality of monetary policy regime will be assessed in our simulations. The 
performance of each policy regime is evaluated in terms of unconditional standard 
deviations for key variables and the value of the loss function.    
4- Bayesian parameter estimation 
In this section we present Bayesian estimates of the deep structural parameters to 
solve the model for the Iranian economy. The approach taken here closely follows 
Lubik and Schorfhide (2006) and Fernández-Villaverde (2007). The log-linearized 
version of the model is comprise of a linear rational expectation system of difference 
equations that can be written in the following form: 
Ω0(𝜗)𝑋𝑡 = Ω1(𝜗)𝑋𝑡−1 +Ω2(𝜗)𝜀𝑡     (64)  
Where 
𝑋𝑡
= {𝑦𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡 , 𝜋𝑡 , 𝜋𝐻,𝑡 , 𝜋𝐹,𝑡 , 𝜋𝑡
∗, 𝑞𝑡 , 𝑟𝑝𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡
∗, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡 , ?̃?𝐹,𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑓𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 , 𝑜𝑟𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡}   (65) 
and  
                               𝜀𝑡 = {𝜀𝑡
𝑥, 𝜀𝑡
𝜋 , 𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝, 𝜀𝑡
𝑔, 𝜀𝑡
𝑎, 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑟 , 𝜀𝑡
𝑖∗ , 𝜀𝑡
𝜋∗}    (66) 
Vector 𝑋𝑡 contains all the variables in the model in the log-linearized form and 𝜀𝑡 is 
the vector for all structural shocks in the model. Ω0(𝜗), Ω1(𝜗) and Ω2(𝜗) are three 
matrices that are non-linear function of structural parameters of the model.  
The general solution to this model can be obtained by multiplying inverse of matrix 
Ω0(𝜗) to both sides of equation (64) to get: 
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𝑋𝑡 = Ω𝑋(𝜗)𝑋𝑡−1 +Ω𝑒(𝜗)𝜀𝑡    (67)   
We need first estimate the structural parameters to find the specific solution of the 
model in (67). Bayesian approach based on a maximum-likelihood estimation of 
parameters in the state space form of a linear rational expectation model is the most 
efficient method. Beside state equation (67), we need to add a measurement equation 
to build up a state-space representation of our model in matrix form (67). Hence, an 
observable variable vector 𝑌𝑡  is defined which is linearly related to 𝑋𝑡  in the 
following form: 
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑆𝑌𝑡       (68)
23 
 
Measurement equation (68) combined with state equation (67) is a state-space 
representation for our rational expectation model. Assuming normally distributed 
innovations, it is possible to compute the conditional likelihood function of the 
structural parameters using the Kalman filter. In the Bayesian approach, a prior 
distribution with a specific density for the structural parameters is assumed, then, 
with the aid of observable data we update the prior distribution through the 
likelihood function to obtain the posterior distribution of structural parameters. Since 
the maximization of the likelihood function is not possible analytically, numerical 
Bayesian simulation methods (Metropolis-Hasting Algorithm) are utilized to draw 
from the posterior distribution. Based on these draws, we can compute the summary 
statistics, namely, posterior means and standard deviations that characterize the 
structural coefficients. 
4.1. Data: 
In the theoretical model there are 8 structural shocks. To avoid stochastic singularity, 
each of these structural shocks should be matched to eight observable time series. 
To estimate the model, quarterly data over the period 1987:4 to 2016:4 is used for 
output, inflation, terms of trade, government expenditure, real exchange rate, and oil 
revenue in dollars. In addition, it is also assumed that the foreign block–foreign 
inflation, and interest rate –is observable and that it is well approximated by US data. 
                                                          
23 Matrix 𝑆 contains 0 and 1 elements for selecting variables of 𝑋𝑡 which are observable variables. 
In order to avoid stochastic singularity, we have matched each structural shock contained in vector 
(66) to an observable variable—which is an element of vector  𝑋𝑡. We chose one set of the elements 
of 𝑋𝑡 represented as, 𝑌𝑡 = {𝑦𝑡 , 𝜋𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡, 𝑔𝑡, 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡, 𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑖𝑡
∗, 𝜋𝑡
∗} and the rest of the variables contained in 
𝑋𝑡 vector are assumed to be non-observable. 
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All U.S. data were downloaded from the FRED, while Iranian data are from Central 
Bank of Iran (CBI) time series database.  
The output, government expenditure, oil revenues series, RER, and terms of trade 
were de-trended via the HP filter. The interest rate and inflation (both CPI and 
foreign) series are de-trended. We have 8 observable variables and the same number 
of structural shocks. 
4.2. Bayesian estimation results 
The first step toward estimating the parameters in the Bayesian approach is to choose 
the prior’s density function. The values for priors were mostly taken from Cavoli 
(2008), Medina and Soto (2007), Kam et al. (2009) and Roger et al. (2009). Table 
(1) provides an overview of the priors used which reflect our views regarding the 
structural parameters of the Iranian economy.  Once the priors have been specified, 
the model can be estimated by computing the posterior mode, and then posteriors 
are evaluated numerically according to the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm—using 5 
blocks of 500,000 random draws in which the first 40 per cent of the draws are used 
as a “burn-in” period. Convergence of the estimates is assessed graphically in order 
to check and ensure the stability of the posterior distribution as described in Brooks 
and Gelman (1998). In table (1), the posterior mean of each parameter are presented. 
Table (1): Baseline Bayesian Estimation for Selected Structural Parameters 
Parameter Description 
Prior 
Posterior Mode 
Density Mean St.Dev. 
σ 
Inverse intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution  
Inverse 
Gamma 
1.7 0.25 2.175 
η Inverse Frisch elasticity  Normal 2 0.15 2.15 
γ Degree of openness  Gamma 0.4 0.05 0.55 
θ 
Elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported goods  
Normal 1 0.06 0.12 
μ Fraction of non-Ricardian house holds Beta 0.4 0.08 0.39 
𝜓q 
Reaction of risk premium to real 
exchange rate 
Beta 0.5 0.25 0.73 
𝜌f Persistence of risk premium Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝛼H 
Fraction of domestic firms who do not 
update their price in any period  
Beta 0.5 0.02 0.42 
𝛼F 
Fraction of importing retailers who do 
not update their price in any period  
Beta 0.6 0.05 0.55 
𝜒 Oil stabilization fund coefficient  Beta 0.4 0.05 0.36 
𝑔𝑦 
Share of government expenditure in 
output in steady state  
Beta 0.4 0.01 0.43 
𝜌𝑌𝑜 Persistence of oil production shock Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝜌𝑃𝑜 Persistence of oil price shock  Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝜌𝑖 Persistence of foreign interest rate Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝜌𝜋 Persistence of foreign inflation Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝜌𝐺 Persistence of government expenditure  Beta 0.5 0.25 0.8 
𝛽 Discount rate for loss function Beta 0.9 0.1 0.985 
Source: Author calculations. 
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5-Results 
The base-line case stipulates that all windfalls are spent and hence there are no 
accumulated reserves and there are no accumulated fiscal deficit. Due to incomplete 
international risk sharing, access to world credit markets for Ricardian agents are 
limited, hence the degree of financial vulnerability is high. Under such conditions, 
occurrence of a negative terms of trade shock results in a higher RER which in turn 
increase the risk premium in the UIP relationship and a higher cost of foreign and 
domestic borrowing. The risk premium in some ways reflect the “country risk”. In 
equation (25) this risk is endogenized via the real exchange rate. For countries with 
limited access to the world capital markets, RER is a function of the import-
coverage-ratio. In high risk states, i.e. when oil-revenue or sudden stop type shocks 
occur, most often import-coverage ratio falls hence the risk premium rises. The 
effect of heightened risks premium is channeled through the UIP condition (equation 
24) and it increases domestic interest rates compared to foreign rates leading to a 
consumption disturbance via Euler equation (16). In our model, the risk premium 
appears in the IS equation (59) with a negative sign. The magnitude of contraction 
in aggregate demand depends on the size of the risk-premium coefficient. This 
coefficient is positively dependent on structural features such as the degree of 
openness and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and it is negatively related 
to the ratio of government expenditure to output in the steady state.24 For a 
contractionary depreciation (devaluation) to occur, the coefficient of RER should be 
sufficiently small so that the impact of a depreciation on the aggregate demand is 
quantitatively less than the impact of a higher risk premium. Our simulations for the 
Iranian economy indicate that a negative oil price (oil revenue) shock results in 
contraction of GDP which emanates from depreciation of RER. 
In the following tables, the value of the relevant structural parameters are shown at 
the top of the table and the estimated value of the loss function and the standard 
deviation of key macroeconomic variables under three distinct monetary-policy 
scenarios are shown in the cells. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 The coefficient, given in conjunction with equation (54), is:  Ω𝑓 = −(1 − 𝑔𝑦)
𝛾
𝜎
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Table 2: Conditional standard deviation for key variables in baseline case.   
Key parameters: openness=0.55, exchange rate pass through=0.48, non-
Ricardian=0.4, financial vulnerability parameter=0.5. 
RERT FCIT FDIT  
0.69 0.98 15.98 Real Exchange rate (SD) 
1.28 1.78 22.08 Risk premium (SD) 
1.25 1.00 4.91 CPI(SD) 
1.11 1.35 1.33 Output gap(SD) 
1.26 1.02 0.97 Domestic inflation (SD) 
75 89 84 Loss function value 
SD=conditional standard deviation. Source: calculations of the authors. 
Table 3: Baseline augmented with an oil stabilization fund (OSF) 
Key parameters: openness=0.55, exchange rate pass through=0.48, non-
Ricardian=0.4, financial vulnerability parameter=0.5. 
RERT FCIT FDIT  
0.62 0.84 14.9 Real Exchange rate (SD) 
1.2 1.42 21.78 Risk premium (SD) 
1.24 1.02 4.97 CPI(SD) 
1.04 1.28 1.30 Output gap(SD) 
1.20 1.009 0.97 Domestic inflation (SD) 
79 80 82 Loss function value 
SD=conditional standard deviation. Source: calculations of the authors. 
Result of the simulations for the base-line case are shown in table (2). From a welfare 
perspective, the optimal policy regime is RERT; it has lower loss values compared 
to the other two policy regimes. The value of the loss function in this framework 
reflects different degrees of trade-offs between CPI, domestic inflation rate, output 
gap and RER. Meaning that the central bank must assume a greater loss for closing 
the output gap in terms of inflation and RER.25 Stabilization performance of the three 
policy regimes is also evaluated on the basis of the conditional standard deviation of 
the key variables. Standard deviation for RER, output gap, and the risk premium 
under RERT is lower while it is bigger for the domestic inflation. 
Table (3) provides simulation results with the same set of key structural parameters 
as in table (2) but assumes the existence of an OSF which allows a different fiscal 
                                                          
25 More precisely, the law of one-price gap, as implied from the Phillips curve. 
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policy posture in that oil windfalls, i.e. revenues above the long-run trend, is saved 
in the OSF. In this case, the loss function value for FCIT falls significantly (from 89 
to 80), that for FDIT is reduced slightly, and the loss value for RERT regime 
increases from 75 to 79, close to that for FCIT. Despite the changes in loss function 
values induced by inclusion of the OSF, RERT continues to be the superior policy 
regime compared to the alternatives. Activation of the OSF has the capability of 
reducing the level of financial vulnerability through a more stable RER and risk 
premium that tends to mitigate the strength of contractionary depreciation channel. 
Table (2) shows that under RERT, the standard deviation of CPI, domestic inflation 
and RER are lower compared to the base-line while that for the output gap is fairly 
similar. Activation of the OSF also results in the reduction of the standard deviation 
for the key macroeconomic variables shown in tables (2) and (3). Note, that 
smoothing of fiscal policy through the OSF tends to promote stability under RERT, 
FCIT, and slightly for FDIT. Since activation of an OSF fund tend to reduce financial 
vulnerability, it is unambiguously stability enhancing.  
 
5-1-Sensitivity analysis  
The main reason RERT was found to be the superior policy is due to the high degree 
of financial vulnerability in the model economy. To a lesser extent the degree of 
openness, the exchange rate pass-through rate, and the non-Ricardian work force 
ratio influence the policy simulation results mentioned in the previous section. In 
this section we present the sensitivity of the loss function for different values of the 
key parameters of the model. We first present the findings for the base-line scenario 
(complete raiding). On the vertical side of figure (1), we have the value of the loss 
function and the coefficient of the real exchange rate in the risk premium equation 
(financial vulnerability coefficient or index). When this coefficient is low RERT is 
an inferior monetary policy regime based on welfare criterion. A low value of 𝜓𝑞 
limits the effect of RER depreciation on the risk premium (hence lower financial 
vulnerability) and the balance sheet effect. RERT curve in figure (1) shows the 
sensitivity of the loss function to a range of the values for 𝜓𝑞. In contrast, high values 
of 𝜓𝑞 makes RERT the superior policy regime. At the lower values of 𝜓𝑞, FDIT is 
superior to RERT, respectively. FDIT is the superior policy regime for the lower 
values of financial vulnerability (0-0.3). Because of relatively rapid rate of the 
exchange rate pass through in the Iranian economy, it is better for the monetary 
authority to control domestic prices rather than to target exogenous import price 
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inflation that influences heavily the CPI. That is why FDIT is superior to FCIT when 
domestic financial markets are well integrated. 
Figure 1: Sensitivity of optimal loss value to financial vulnerability coefficient  
 
 
We also present the sensitivity of the loss function to different values of the degree 
of openness, which through the IS equation influences the impact of a change in the 
risk premium on the aggregate demand. In figure (2) the vertical axis represents the 
value of loss and the horizontal axis represents the degree of openness for a 
reasonable range of this coefficient (0.2-0.8). For a given value of other parameters 
(in particular a high financial vulnerability ratio of 0.7 given in table 1), for openness 
values between 0.3-0.7 RERT is the superior policy regime. When the economy is 
nearly completely open, FDIT is the superior policy strategy for the reason 
mentioned previously. When the level of exchange rate pass through is high, the 
predominant effect of exchange rate movements is expenditure switching thus by 
controlling domestic prices economic inefficiencies are minimized.  
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of optimal loss 
value to degree of openness. 
Figure 3: Sensitivity of optimal loss 
value to exchange rate pass-through rate. 
 
 
 
In figure (3) the horizontal axis is the degree of the exchange rate pass through. With 
low pass through rates, expenditure switching effect due to exchange rate 
movements is weak. This combined with high financial vulnerability render RERT 
the superior policy regime. As pass-through rates increases, FDIT becomes the 
superior policy regime.26 Note that, under complete international risk sharing, FCIT 
would be the optimal policy since at low values of pass through there is also the 
possibility of import-price distortions and hence CPI price targeting is the optimal 
policy (Engel, 2010). However, in our case, financial integration into the world 
markets is incomplete, hence the results differ from the standard case.  
 
What happens when a higher proportion of the agents are non-Ricardian? In figure 
(4), the horizontal axis represents the ratio of NRH to total work force. As indicated 
in this figure, a higher share of NRH will increase the loss function value for RERT 
and FDIT, while it is almost unchanged for the FCIT regime. Since NRH's 
consumption is not sensitive to interest rate changes, when their share in total 
workforce increases the effectiveness of monetary policy to close output gap via 
tuning the interest rate adjustment is dented. Therefore, loss function values is 
                                                          
26 Note that if we make standard base-case New-Keynesian assumption like complete international risk sharing 
FCIT would be the optimal policy since at low values of pass through there is also the possibility of import-price 
distortions and hence CPI price targeting is the optimal policy (Engel, 2008). 
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increasing in higher non-Ricardian share. Moreover, the efficacy of the fiscal rule is 
even more pronounced at the high ratios of NRHs.   
Figure 4: Sensitivity of optimal loss 
value to Non-Ricardian workforce ratio. 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of optimal loss values 
to OSF coefficient (𝜒). 
  
 
Next, we augment the base-line scenarios with a fiscal rule that stipulates what 
fraction of oil windfalls is injected into the OSF in high revenue periods and what 
fraction is withdrawn from it during low oil revenue periods—𝜒 in equation (53). In 
figure (5), the horizontal axis represents the value of 𝜒. The loss function value for 
FCIT and FDIT are declining with respect to the value of 𝜒 while in the RERT policy 
regime the loss function values is u-shaped in 𝜒 and increases at a higher rate as it 
reaches its extreme upper value. Despite lower loss value for FCIT when 𝜒 is higher, 
both FCIT and FDIT are dominated by RERT regime in our model. Note that this 
result assumes high financial vulnerability and other structural parameters that are 
specified in table (1). Note that fiscal policy rule significantly reduces the loss 
function for the FCIT regime, its influence is not sufficient to dominate RERT 
regime.     
  
6-Concluding remarks 
Standard flexible IT with floating exchange rates tends to work fairly well as a 
macro-stabilization framework in the country-groups where the macroeconomic 
environment is less volatile, financial vulnerability is relatively low  (e.g., foreign 
currency reserves are high and foreign debt by households and business sectors are 
low), and monetary policy is more credible. Is the standard IT the proper policy 
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framework to stabilize output and inflation in an economy with relatively high 
exchange rate pass through rates and financially vulnerable economies? To answer 
this question we developed a micro-founded New Keynesian DSGE model that 
incorporates three features of the latter group: commodity (oil) exporting countries 
that are exposed to significant price volatility and are financially vulnerable. In our 
model economy, RER is subject to large commodity price shocks which in turn 
renders risk premium highly variable.27 Depreciation of RER emanating from a 
negative oil (commodity) price shock has two distinct consequences: expenditure-
switching and the balance-sheet effect. If the latter is stronger, which is more 
probable in financially vulnerable economies, "contractionary devaluation" would 
be the outcome. In such a case, the standard IT with flexible exchange rate is not the 
optimal policy since the central bank cannot rely solely on short-term interest rates 
to conduct internal and external stabilization and should react to unwarranted 
movements in RER. 
 
High exchange rate pass-through and financial vulnerability result in the emergence 
of two sources of trade-offs namely the law of one price gap and relative demand 
gap beside domestic price rigidity in our model. We evaluated the stability and 
welfare performance of a loss function consisting of the CPI inflation gap, output 
gap and real exchange rate gap, utilizing optimal Ramsey rule method28. Within this 
context, we evaluated monetary policy regimes described as flexible domestic 
inflation targeting, flexible CPI inflation targeting, and real exchange rate targeting. 
The result of the simulations indicate that with the economic structure specified as 
in this paper and parameters presented in table (1), RERT is the superior policy 
regime. Financial vulnerability in this model explains why departure from floating 
exchange rate in an inflation targeting framework is the appropriate policy and not 
merely a “fear”. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the policy regime superiority 
depends on the parameter values for financial vulnerability, the degree of openness, 
the pass-through rate, and the share of Non-Ricardian agents in the work force. The 
fiscal rule introduced into the model did not change the main result of the paper, that 
is, the superiority of the RERT for the Iranian economy—even though its inclusion 
improved FCIT performance very significantly. However, with low financial 
vulnerability, FCIT regime's welfare performance is better than RERT and the 
central bank can practice standard inflation targeting without any requirement for its 
intervention in the currency market. Financial vulnerability is a key factor with a 
                                                          
27 This is supported empirically by econometric test of the UIP relationship in Iran. See Jalali-Naini and Naderian 
(2016). 
28 As explained in section (4-1), in this method a feedback rule is not imposed on the model structure. Instead, the 
policy rules are obtained from minimizing the above-mentioned loss functions subject to model structure.  
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very significant influence for the conduct of monetary policy and, in particular, the 
choice of the appropriate policy regime. 
 
One aspect of commodity-exporting countries that has significant bearing on the 
conduct of monetary policy is the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, in particular the 
positive correlation between the commodity price shock and RER. A positive price 
shocks usually is translated into a larger oil-financed government budget, and higher 
supply of foreign currency. The initial impact is to increase aggregate demand and 
appreciation of RER. Since the expansion is not either due to or accompanied by a 
positive productivity shock, higher inflation and depreciation of RER dampen the 
initial expansion.  In our model, a simple fiscal rule along with an oil stabilization 
fund is added to the model that can control demand cycles associated with oil-
financed fiscal expansions. The rule creates an environment where monetary policy 
can be more effective, currency fluctuations less disruptive, hence there would be 
less aversion to floating of the currency. By directing a fraction of oil revenues 
during high price states into OSF and withdrawing from it during low price states, 
pro-cyclicality is contained and the propagation effects of the price shocks through 
the fiscal side is controlled. Operationalizing the OSF reduces exchange rate 
volatility, which in-turn, provides more space for the central banks to follow 
inflation targeting with less requirement with more limited intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. 
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